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ABSTRACT 
An increasing number of financial services (FS) companies are adopting solutions driven 
by artificial intelligence (AI) to gain operational efficiencies, derive strategic insights, and im-
prove customer engagement. However, the rate of adoption has been low, in part due to the 
apprehension around its complexity and self-learning capability, which makes auditability a 
challenge in a highly regulated industry. There is limited literature on how FS companies can 
implement the governance and controls specific to AI-driven solutions. AI auditing cannot be 
performed in a vacuum; the risks are not confined to the algorithm itself, but rather permeates 
the entire organization. Using the risk of unfairness as an example, this paper will introduce 
the overarching governance strategy and control framework to address the practical challenges 
in mitigating risks AI introduces. With regulatory implications and industry use cases, this 
framework will enable leaders to innovate with confidence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adoption of AI in the FS sector is still in its infancy, according to a recent 
survey of more than 3,000 C-suite executives conducted by Deloitte and the 
European Financial Management Association (EFMA). The survey results 
show that 11% had not started any activities in AI, and 40% were still learning 
how AI could be deployed in their organizations.1 
For the purpose of this discussion, we use the term AI generally to refer 
to the collection of techniques that leverage machine learning to perform tasks 
that normally require human intelligence, including natural language pro-
cessing, speech recognition, and decision-making under uncertainty. Tradi-
tional approaches to tasks were either a people-based process or a systemic 
 1. Louise Brett et al., AI and You: Perceptions of Artificial Intelligence from the EMEA financial 
services industry, DELOITTE 9 (Apr. 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
cn/Documents/technology/deloitte-cn-tech-ai-and-you-en-170801.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R688-FSQS]. 
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rules-based process. Loans were either granted at the discretion of the bank 
manager or by using a scorecard to calculate a customer’s risk level. The un-
precedented availability of affordable computer power and the rise in volume 
and variety of data gave rise to new and advanced algorithms to analyze more 
information faster. These AI tools can be static and periodically updated, e.g., 
a revenue forecasting model that is updated per fiscal quarter, or live and con-
tinuously evolving with a real-time feedback cycle, e.g., a chatbot that learns in 
real-time from the user’s input. 
Despite the slow adoption rate, FS firms are exploring how to leverage AI 
to drive cost efficiencies and maintain competitiveness. Most banking execu-
tives (65%) see the highest potential impact of AI in customer service, while 
most insurance executives (78%) view back office and operations as the best 
part of the value chain for AI use.2  
FS is a highly regulated industry, comprising a wide variety of complex 
business lines and products. Given the history of regulatory penalties levied 
for non-compliance or misconduct in the FS industry and the growing regula-
tory scrutiny around the use of AI, the conservatism in its adoption is under-
standable.  
In the past year, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Infor-
mation Commissioner’s Office (ICO) have been actively issuing opinions on 
AI and machine learning. While regulators are not proactively designing regu-
lation for AI, they are formulating their expectations with their recent publica-
tions on algorithmic trading,3 supervision of internal models,4 and Senior Man-
agers and Certification Schemes (SM&CS).5 Conscious of the lag between the 
pace at which new technologies evolve and the speed at which new regulations 
can be developed, regulators have historically adopted the principle of “tech-
nological neutrality.” Therefore, the same regulatory principles in the afore-
mentioned publications apply to firms regardless of the technology they use to 
perform a regulated activity. They can also be seen as indicators as to how AI 
may be regulated in the future. 
 2. Id. at 7, 12. 
 3. See Algorithmic Trading Compliance in Wholesale Markets, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY 
(Feb. 2018), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/multi-firm-reviews/algorithmic-trading-
compliance-wholesale-markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWS2-UERJ] [hereinafter Algorithmic 
Trading Compliance]. 
 4. See ECB guide to internal models, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/internal_mod-
els/ssm.guidegeneraltopics.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV3T-HC6K]. 
 5. See Senior Managers Regime, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY 3 (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/applying-smr-to-fca.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E95F-FPVE]. 
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Past literature on the use of AI has focused on the techniques, tools, and 
methodologies to ensure the fairness, accountability, and transparency of AI 
algorithms. However, there has been little effort to contextualize these findings 
within regulatory limitations, and the connection between the technical frame-
works and the governance process of an organization has largely been over-
looked. Despite the numerous competing mathematical formalizations of fair-
ness, the practical implications for industry on how to implement fair 
algorithms are uncertain.  
This paper will use the risk of discrimination as an example to discuss the 
practical FS challenges of managing risks introduced by AI. We will walk 
through an AI product lifecycle and reveal the process by which risks can be 
identified, assessed, controlled, and monitored in an FS company by deriving 
recommended practices and principles from past publications by regulators. 
While it may refer to external regulations, most examples will be drawn from 
the European Union and the United Kingdom. 
II. FAIRNESS IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
Machine learning is increasingly being used to make or aid decisions that 
are consequential to FS customers, from evaluating their credit worthiness to 
recommending investment products to pricing their insurance premiums. It 
also impacts employees, with CV screening algorithms and performance track-
ing measures. 
Historically, FS companies have focused on limited types of data that di-
rectly relate to the desired outcome. For auto insurance, such metrics included 
past driving convictions and number of years of driving experience.6 For credit 
risk, they included debt-to-income ratio and past payment histories.7 With the 
advent of big data analytics, firms are beginning to incorporate non-traditional 
types of data into their algorithms as proxies of risk. Controversially, insurance 
pricing has been found to be influenced by an applicant’s email domain name 
 6. See, e.g., How Is My Insurance Premium Calculated, THINK INSURANCE, 
https://www.thinkinsurance.co.uk/personal/young-driver-insurance/how-is-my-insurance-
premium-calculated [https://perma.cc/HRT4-KJAM] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
 7. See What risks do banks take, BANK ENG., https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
knowledgebank/what-risks-do-banks-take [https://perma.cc/QHE4-QJ5A] (last visited Oct. 
12, 2019). 
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and surname,8 and credit lending decisions can depend on an individual’s In-
ternet browsing history.9  
Prior to the availability of big data and machine learning algorithms, com-
panies could avoid liability by showing that any unequal treatment of protected 
class was unintentional because the protected attributes were not considered 
in the decision-making process. AI-driven processes are less transparent than 
traditional systemic rules-based processes due to their ability to extract patterns 
from complex feature relationships. Recent legal rulings, however, have trans-
ferred the emphasis from discriminatory intent to discriminatory impact. The 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld “disparate impact” claims under the Fair Housing 
Act in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc.10 The case found unintentional discrimination to be illegal if the 
plaintiff can show a disproportionate impact on a protected group.11 In the 
United Kingdom, Essop v. Home Office similarly found indirect discrimination 
to be unlawful in hiring practices.12 
As discrimination gets embedded in such complex relationships in social 
data within “black box” algorithms, and as governments increasingly focus on 
impact rather than intent of discrimination, new approaches to identifying the 
harm in these automated decision tools are required. Given a bias, people-
based processes may arrive at different decisions. AI, by contrast, can replicate 
an identical bias at-scale, crystalizing the bias and removing the outcome am-
biguity associated with human decision-making. This is especially concerning 
in domain areas with documented historical discrimination, as AI can exacer-
bate any underlying societal problems and inequalities. Even if AI is designed 
to augment human decision-making rather than completely replace it, the busi-
ness users may not comprehend the confidence intervals provided and may 
 8. John Leonard, Admiral Insurance found to give higher quotes to Hotmail users and people called 
Mohammed, COMPUTING (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/3025139/
admiral-insurance-found-to-give-higher-quotes-to-hotmail-users-and-people-called-moham-
med [https://perma.cc/7793-U9SX]. 
 9. James Rufus Koren, What does that Web search say about your credit?, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 
2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-zestfinance-baidu-20160715-snap-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/T2M3-WZ5M]. 
 10. Deborah B. Baum et al., Supreme Court Affirms FHA Disparate Impact Claims, 
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (July 21, 2015), https://www.pills-
burylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/supreme-court-affirms-fha-disparate-impact-
claims.html [https://perma.cc/7J85-7AMP]. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Tom Lowenthal, Essop v Home Office: Proving Indirect Discrimination, OXFORD HUM. 
RTS. HUB (Apr. 6, 2017), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/essop-v-home-office-proving-indirect-dis-
crimination [https://perma.cc/VN5K-Q6XP]. 
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not feel comfortable overriding the algorithm in practice, given the complexity 
of how it reached the decision. 
On the other hand, the rulings stipulate that if the accused can prove a 
legitimate business necessity, this treatment can be deemed lawful; however, 
the required evidence for this justification is unclear and has not yet been stud-
ied. In the United States, the “business necessity clause” states disparate impact 
can be justified to meet performance-related constraints, provided the least 
possible disparate impact is incurred given the constraints.13 In the United 
Kingdom, following the Supreme Court ruling of Essop v Home Office, a provi-
sion, criterion, or practice (PCP) can be justified by showing it is a “propor-
tionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”14 
In July 2018, the FCA wrote that while traditionally they have focused on 
procedural fairness in assessing firms’ conduct, there are cases for intervention 
to ensure distributive fairness in pricing discrimination.15 The FCA lists six 
evidential questions to assess whether an intervention is required: 
customer vulnerability; 
scale of adverse effect; 
number of people affected; 
lack of transparency in pricing methodologies; 
essential nature of product or service; and 
societal views of unfairness.16 
This suggests a step further in the regulators’ focus on impact over intent, 
and organizations will need to shift to an outcome-based analysis of whether 
their processes are fair.  
This paper will use the risk of unlawful discrimination as an example in 
exploring how an FS company would manage this risk throughout an AI solu-
tion’s product lifecycle. 
III. MANAGING RISKS OF AI THROUGH ITS LIFECYCLE 
 Academic research has focused on model and algorithmic risks, such as 
bias and accuracy, in isolation. In reality, model design and performance must 
 13. Baum, supra note 10. 
 14. Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 15. Mary Starks et al., Price discrimination in financial services, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY 1 
(July 2018), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/price_discrimination_in_finan-
cial_services.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WK8-LT34]. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
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also consider non-model risk domains, such as regulatory and compliance risk, 
technology risk, people risk, supplier risk, conduct risk, and market risk. 
For example, assessing a model for fairness is not a purely mathematical 
or computational problem. The appropriate definition, assessment, and reme-
diation has to consider the regulations guiding the use case, the potential tech-
nological limitations in its implementation, and the alignment with the com-
pany’s risk appetite, ethics, and core values. 
The adoption of AI does not require an overhaul of the existing enterprise 
Risk Management Framework (RMF), but rather an awareness of how AI may 
complicate the detection of risks as they manifest themselves in unfamiliar 
ways. The volume and speed of data processed may require a much faster re-
action speed for any errors, and the complexity of a machine learning algo-
rithm may hinder its explainability and auditability. 
Supervisors will expect firms to have robust and effective governance in 
place, including RMF, to identify, reduce, and control any of the risks associ-
ated with the development and ongoing use of each AI application across the 
business. The RMF should be approved by the board.17 
A. DESIGN 
1. Definition of  Scope 
A recent FCA report18 outlines the requirement for firms to define algo-
rithmic trading, with the objective to ensure that firms establish an appropriate 
process to identify and manage its usage. The FCA can require firms to provide 
a description of their algorithmic trading strategies within fourteen days.19 Sim-
ilarly, FS firms will need to define the scope for what constitutes an AI tech-
nology or solution.20 The difference between AI and rules-based systems, ro-
botic process automation, and static mathematical models should be clear to 
both management and employees.21  
The scope should reflect the regulatory implications around the firm’s use 
of AI.22 Increasingly, AI solutions in industry leverage third-party machine 
learning algorithms as accelerators for development. While the build process 
may have been outsourced, the FS firm is still liable for all associated risks.23 A 
 17. Tom Bigham et al., AI and risk management, DELOITTE 18 (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Financial-Ser-
vices/deloitte-gx-ai-and-risk-management.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3BT-3VP5]. 
 18. See Algorithmic Trading Compliance, supra note 3. 
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. Id. at 8–9. 
 21. See Bigham et al., supra note 17. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Algorithmic Trading Compliance, supra note 3, at 5, 16, 26. 
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retail banking chatbot powered by a Natural Language Processing application 
programming interface (API) provided by a third-party company should still 
fall under the scope of AI RMF because accountability for any legal or regula-
tory breach still lies with the firm. The FCA advises, where there is technical 
outsourcing, “the firm remains fully responsible for its regulatory obliga-
tions.”24 
2. Risk Identification and Assessment 
For firms to identify and assess the impact of AI use cases on their risk 
appetite, they should first develop a set of clear and consistent assessment cri-
teria to apply to all such cases. The firm should identify relevant risk domains 
for a solution as well as specific product risks and then assess whether the level 
of residual risk is acceptable given the existing controls. It is critical that the 
risk assessment and management process do not constrict creativity. The main 
objective is to ensure that risks are identified early and properly managed to 
create a safe setting for innovation. Relevant considerations include: 
External vs. internal: The intended audience of the AI solution 
will determine the conduct risk implications as well as the thresh-
old confidence level and performance the solution is required to 
reach prior to deployment. For example, an insurance pricing 
model with a customer user interface has a higher risk of unfair 
outcomes than an income validation model being used by employ-
ees. 
Use of personal information: Under the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, Privacy Impact Assessment 
should be performed if the organization plans to process personal 
data. An algorithm using personal information for decision-making 
should be assessed for fairness. In addition, GDPR gives consum-
ers additional rights to understand and take control of how firms 
are using their personal data. The UK Information Commissioner 
pointed out that “where a decision has been made by a machine 
that has a significant impact on an individual, the GDPR requires 
that they have the right to challenge the decision and a right to 
have it explained to them.”25 While there have been disagreements 
among academics on the definition of and the legal basis for this 
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. Science and Technology Committee, Oral evidence: Algorithms in decision-making, HC 
351, HOUSE OF COMMONS (Jan. 23, 2018), http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/com-
mitteeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/algorithms-in-
%20decisionmaking/oral/77536.html [https://perma.cc/W4SY-WXYQ]. 
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“right to explanation,”26 firms should nonetheless have a process 
in place to respond to customers’ inquiries in a meaningful, trans-
parent, and understandable manner and be able to demonstrate 
that an algorithm is compliant with data protection requirements. 
Data accuracy and quality: All input and training data into the 
machine learning model should be high quality and fit for its in-
tended purpose. This includes a review of the data collection meth-
odology for potential selection bias and an evaluation of the distri-
bution of outcomes for possible biases against protected classes. 
Societal views of unfairness, aside from being an FCA criterion for inter-
vention, can lead to reputational damage. When an investigation revealed that 
motorists named Mohammed are being charged up to £919 more in car insur-
ance than men with typically white, English names, it led to public outcry and 
calls for a boycott.27 To avoid such scrutiny, features that are input into the 
model should be assessed for appropriateness. 
Figure 1 visualizes a possible decision boundary for whether or not an in-
put variable should be used in a model. Given the decisions in Essop v Home 
Office and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc., even if a feature is correlated to a protected characteristic, there 
may be reasonable grounds to use it for business objectives. For example, 
among loan applicants, income levels may differ between men and women 
because more women work part-time. Income may still be used in a lending 
decision due to its high relevance to the risk of default. In contrast, an email 
domain name may be predictive of risk, but if it is highly correlated to race, it 
may need to be removed from the model due to the lack of foundation of a 
causal link to risk. 
 
 26. Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 76–99 (2017). 
 27. Lester Holloway, Boycott car insurance firms that discriminate, OPERATION BLACK VOTE 
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.obv.org.uk/news-blogs/boycott-car-insurance-firms-discrimi-
nate [https://perma.cc/9QWW-G7FN]. 
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Figure 1: Decision boundary for acceptable use of input variables 
 
Figure 2: Decision boundary shifts 
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This decision boundary may shift depending on the conditions outlined by 
the FCA for possible intervention. The drivers of decision-making in provid-
ing essential products, such as checking account, car insurance, or mortgage, 
may be subject to higher scrutiny than the rationale for offering premium 
credit cards. This is also related to the greater number of people and a higher 
proportion of vulnerable customers in essential financial products.  
This pre-processing step ensures that the decision to include features cor-
related to protected characteristics is carefully considered within the context 
of the regulated domain and the potential impact on consumers. 
3. Risk Management Plan and Control Design 
Risk management plans should mitigate the risks identified in the assess-
ment, and the residual risk should be in line with the given overall risk appetite. 
This includes the appropriate controls and testing methodologies, which may 
vary depending on the FS domain. 
Considering the example of the risk of unlawful discrimination, the appro-
priate control would be to test the algorithm for fairness. Yet, the numerous 
competing mathematical definitions of fairness only obfuscate its criteria, hin-
dering the ability of business leaders to enforce its implementation. In order 
to formulate a risk management plan, an appropriate and actionable definition 
of fairness should be assigned for each use case. 
Fairness through Unawareness: This model attempts to avoid discrim-
ination by excluding protected attributes from the model build. Given the 
power of machine learning algorithms to deduce complex patterns from other 
features, this does not guarantee a fair outcome. One example of this is the 
impact of the controversial EU ruling to prohibit car insurance companies 
from discriminating based on gender in order to counteract the fact that men 
paid more for insurance than women. Rather than the gap between men and 
women’s insurance premiums narrowing, it has widened from £27 to £101, as 
insurance companies have turned to gender-correlated proxies for risk meas-
urement, such as occupation and average length of driving history.28  
While this may be considered more fair if we believe the new prices are 
reflective of true risk differences between men and women, it is less equitable 
and would not meet some of the constraints of other definitions of fairness. 
The model may still be discriminating based on gender through its proxies. In 
a 2018 study of 1 million insurance quotes in the United Kingdom, the median 
price was the highest for laborers (e.g., construction workers) and barbers—
 28. Patrick Collinson, How an EU gender equality ruling widened inequality, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/money/blog/2017/jan/14/eu-gender-ruling-car-
insurance-inequality-worse [https://perma.cc/6BV8-334Z]. 
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stereotypically male jobs—and the lowest for personal assistants and secretar-
ies—stereotypically female jobs.29 
Defining A as the protected attribute, Y as the actual outcome, and  as 
the predicted outcome, other fairness metrics in existing statistics literature 
include: 
Demographic parity:30 Demographic parity (group fairness) is a popula-
tion-level metric where the outcome is independent of the protected attribute. 
Formally: 
 
As Gajane and Pechenizkiy argue, this metric is feasible where there is no 
reliable “ground truth” data, such as in credit risk and employment where his-
torical discrimination against protected groups is well-documented.31 They are, 
on the other hand, ineffective where disproportionality in outcomes can be 
justified by non-protected, non-proxy attributes, as this can lead to reverse 
discrimination and inaccurate predictions.32 It is also not stipulated to select 
the most optimal outcome.33 In these cases, the tradeoff between accuracy and 
demographic parity may be too significant for application in business-critical 
usage, such as pricing. In employment, where there is an additional interest in 
increasing the diversity of the workforce, demographic parity may be a useful 
metric to ensure an equitable representation of all protected classes. 
Counterfactual fairness:34 This model posits that given a causal model 
(U, V, F) with a set of observable variables (V), a set of latent background 
variables (U) not caused by V, and a set of functions (F), the counterfactual of 
belonging to a protected class is independent of the outcome. Where X repre-
sents the remaining attributes, A represents the binary protected attribute, and 
Y is the actual outcome, and  is the predicted outcome, formally: 
 
 29. Rebecca Rutt, How much does your job cost in car insurance, THIS IS MONEY (Apr. 26, 
2018), http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-5637979/The-jobs-expensive-
car-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/YE2F-PJV3]. 
 30. Nina Grgic-Hlaca et al., The case for process fairness in learning: Feature selection for fair 
decision making, NIPS SYMP. ON MACHINE LEARNING & L. (2016) [https://perma.cc/D5XT-
FZJV]. 
 31. Pratik Gajane & Mykola Pechenizkiy, On formalizing fairness in prediction with machine 
learning, ARXIV (May 28, 2018) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.03184.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7TPK-HKFM]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Matt Kusner et al., Counterfactual Fairness, ARXIV (Mar. 8, 2018) https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1703.06856.pdf [https://perma.cc/82PV-BF6Z]. 
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While the methodology of causal inference is robust, causal links are often 
difficult to hypothesize in complex FS domains. An FCA report acknowledges 
the challenge of disentangling the differences in actuarial risk (cost-based pric-
ing) from different willingness to pay (price discrimination).35 The metric is 
additionally prone to hindsight bias and outcome bias.36 
Individual fairness:37 Individual fairness states that similar individuals get 
similar outputs. Formally, for similar individuals i and j: 
 
This criterion has a high dependency on the measurement of “similarity” 
between individuals that does not correlate to the protected characteristics. It 
is also more computationally intensive than population-level metrics, which 
could be a challenge for any real-time solutions with Big Data. 
Equalized odds / equalized opportunity:38 Equalized odds imply that 
predicted outcome given actual outcome is independent on predicted pro-
tected attribute given actual outcome. This guarantees that the predicted out-
come has equal true positive rates across protected characteristics. Equalized 
opportunity focuses on the true positives: given a positive outcome, the pre-
diction is independent of the protected attribute. Defining A as the protected 
attribute, Y as the actual outcome, and  as the predicted outcome, formaliza-
tion of equalized odds is:   
 
Similarly, equalized opportunity meets the following condition: 
 
The relative importance of the accuracy metrics can differ across FS use 
cases. For example, a mortgage lending company may be most concerned 
about the algorithm’s false positive rates (i.e., approving loans that lead to de-
fault). A retail bank with an algorithm to predict expected churn may focus on 
the false negative rates (i.e., was offered a better rate, but left anyway). The 
equalized odds and equalized opportunity metrics fail to address discrimina-
tion that may already be embedded in the data.39  
 35. Starks et al., supra note 15. 
 36. Gajane & Pechenizkiy, supra note 31. 
 37. Grgic-Hlaca et al., supra note 30. 
 38. Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning, ARXIV (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.02413.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C7W-YESH]. 
 39. Gajane & Pechenizkiy, supra note 31. 
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For any AI with the risk of discrimination against protected classes, appro-
priate definition of fairness and justification should be required, taking into 
consideration the strengths and weaknesses of each option and the regulatory 
implications of its implementation in the FS domain. Once selected, the metric 
can be used to test the predictions for fairness as a part of the control process. 
The firm should also bring in stakeholders from legal risk and ethics teams to 
ensure the definitions are aligned to the companies’ ethical values and risk ap-
petite. 
4. Defined Roles and Responsibilities 
Given the potentially far-reaching implications of AI use on a business, FS 
firms may need to involve a wider set of stakeholders from first, second, and 
third lines of defense throughout the product lifecycle. Under SM&CS, senior 
management should be prepared to evidence an effective governance and risk 
framework for AI solutions. Good practice involves senior management’s par-
ticipation throughout the testing and development process and understanding 
of potential market conduct consequences.  
The risk and compliance functions should be involved at each stage of the 
development, testing, and implementation process. In the publication on algo-
rithmic trading, the FCA particularly noted that compliance staff should aim 
to have the required knowledge and skills to provide sufficient challenge to the 
development of algorithms, which may initially involve conducting a gap anal-
ysis of their ability to supervise algorithmic trading activity and establishing 
new roles and responsibilities where required.40  
There should be close collaboration with the technical owner of the AI 
model and the business owner of the model outcome, with a gradual hand-off 
of accountability through the lifecycle from design to productionization. 
B. BUILD 
The AI development process can pose a challenge to traditional risk man-
agers due to the agile approach often adopted by data science and AI teams. It 
is important to bridge the gap between traditional risk functions and technical 
teams, as the technical team is not always aware of business and risk challenges. 
For example, a team may use an open source tool without reviewing whether 
the license allows for its commercial use. Thus, controls for risks should be 
embedded into the development process. For example, use of an open source 
tool should trigger a required process to obtain approval from the legal team 
to proceed after reviewing the terms of the open source license. Below are 
analogous regulatory principles for other technologies that apply equally to AI. 
 40. Algorithmic Trading Compliance, supra note 3. 
2020] INNOVATING WITH CONFIDENCE 15 
1. Development and Testing Process 
By maintaining a robust, consistent, and well-understood development and 
testing framework, firms need to ensure that their development of algorithms 
is consistent with the risk appetite and behavioral expectations of the firm. The 
requirements are similar to those proposed by the FCA for algorithmic trading. 
Before sign-off, firms need to complete a comprehensive review and approval 
process, and all stakeholders need to confirm that their assigned tasks are com-
pleted, verified, and documented. 
2. Governance and Oversight 
Firms should aim to have an independent multi-disciplinary governance 
committee to review the documentation and completion of testing procedures 
and to verify that the algorithm is consistent with the original specifications. 
Its members should be trained to understand the risks associated with AI ap-
plications. The issue of fairness, for example, requires both domain knowledge 
and understanding of the mathematical trade-offs. These committees should 
establish the testing and assurance process and regularly review the perfor-
mance to identify emerging issues. 
3. Documented Change Management, Testing, and Approval 
Throughout the development and testing process, firms should ensure 
they have adequate documentation and a comprehensive audit trail for all AI 
applications deployed throughout their organization, including the relevant 
owners and key compliance and risk controls in place. Should there be a 
change in the definition of fairness, for example, this falls under the category 
of material change and approvals by relevant stakeholders should be recorded. 
4. Transparency and Explainability 
An analysis of model drivers should reveal any features that should not be 
impacting the model. If a person’s preferred email address provider is high-
lighted as a potential driver for insurance pricing, this should feed into the 
algorithm’s fairness analysis to ensure this feature is not being used as a proxy 
for a protected characteristic. Methodological transparency was explicitly listed 
by the FCA41 and the GDPR as a requirement for algorithmic decision-making. 
As the UK Information Commissioner stated earlier this year, “[w]e may need, 
as a regulator, to look under the hood or behind the curtain to see what data 
were used, what training data were used, what factors were programmed into 
the system, and what question the AI system was trained to answer.”42 GDPR 
 41. Starks et al., supra note 15. 
 42. Bigham et al., supra note 17. 
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will require a shift in relationships with regulators, requiring appropriately 
funded regulatory affairs teams to discuss any planned high-risk automated 
data processing. 
C. PRODUCTIONIZE 
Unlike robotic process automation and other rules-based and deterministic 
systems, risks in AI-driven solutions are dynamic and more challenging to de-
tect. This requires a shift in mindset for risk managers, who will need to remain 
involved in the risk monitoring process. Prior to productionization, the solu-
tion should be safe to deploy at-scale by embedding automated controls. 
1. Ensuring Solution Is Safe to Scale 
High data processing volume and speed may require a much faster reaction 
speed for any errors because risk events can propagate much faster. There 
should be sufficient controls in place prior to go-live, with rules and thresholds 
programmed for when human intervention is required. The FCA, in its publi-
cation on algorithmic trading compliance, mandated a clear explanation of the 
conditions that need to be met before being implemented into a live environ-
ment.43 
2. Review the Feedback Mechanism 
For machine learning algorithms with live incoming data, there should be 
a control to flag unsuitable input. A chatbot, for example, should not learn 
from inflammatory or profane user comments. A pricing algorithm should not 
react erratically to external shocks.  
The appropriateness of the feedback loop should also be considered. In a 
credit risk algorithm, a bank is likely to lack data on the individuals who were 
denied a loan, even if they proceeded to get a loan elsewhere. The counterfac-
tual of the decision, i.e., whether they would have paid back the loan had they 
been approved, is unknown. This missingness should be considered when 
evaluating the accuracy of the model. In the decision boundaries of the model, 
continuous experimentation to grant credit to those who were just outside the 
cut-off point can provide the business with evidence on whether the policy is 
appropriate. 
3. “Kill Switch” and Business Continuity 
Firms should document procedures and controls for a manual “kill switch” 
to stop an algorithm from operating once a critical error or abnormal behavior 
is detected. Business continuity plans may need to be redefined to provide a 
 43. Algorithmic Trading Compliance, supra note 3. 
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contingency plan for roll-back to manual processes with minimal disruption to 
critical business processes. 
D. MONITOR 
Due to the continuously-evolving nature of AI, a more dynamic monitor-
ing approach will be required to ensure a model is still performing as intended 
for its specific use case. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), including 
non-functional requirements such as fairness, need to be continuously moni-
tored for appropriateness, relevance, and accuracy. In addition, real-time 
measures of risk (KRIs) can help inform the second and third lines of defense. 
An example of this would be the number of complaints and appeals against an 
AI credit decision on the basis of perceived unfairness. 
1. Automated Monitoring and Testing 
AI-driven solutions can be leveraged for AI risk monitoring. For example, 
a machine learning-driven solution can monitor phone conversations between 
an insurance agent and a customer to predict the probability of mis-selling. In 
this tool called TrueVoice, subject matter experts in both insurance and con-
duct risk have developed and trained custom metrics such as customer vulner-
ability, dominance, and loss aversion, all of which indicate a higher likelihood 
of mis-selling.44 
2. Vulnerable Customers 
Another potential post-processing step may be needed to ensure fairness. 
If the model results in high variability in outcomes between protected classes, 
especially if vulnerable customers are involved, an organization may imple-
ment a rules-based approach to limit the variation. If a customer is rated as 
high risk due to the unusual circumstances surrounding his or her vulnerability, 
some flexibility is required. The FCA defines a vulnerable customer as “some-
one who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to det-
riment, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care.”45 
In particular, the FCA lists “lack of suitable affordable products for people in 
some non-standard situations” as a potential conduct risk and recommends 
that “[f]lexibility in the application of terms and conditions of products and 
 44. TrueVoice, DELOITTE UK, (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/risk/
solutions/truevoice.html [https://perma.cc/QEJ7-EKTV] (last visited Sept 18, 2019). 
 45. Consumer Vulnerability, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-8-exec-sum-
mary.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK77-WAVK]. 
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services play[] a significant role [to] ensur[e] the needs of consumers in vulner-
able circumstances are met.”46 An FS organization may put guardrails in place 
to limit the level of variability if a customer is deemed to be vulnerable. 
3. Periodic Re-validation 
External and internal events can result in a change to the organization’s 
risk profile. New legal and regulatory developments may require a change in 
the design of the model. Media scrutiny of a use case may make a solution non-
viable. Legal teams should communicate any changes and their implications to 
business owners. 
4. Internal Audit Planning 
Internal Audit (IA) functions should receive training to acquire adequate 
expertise to properly understand the risks associated with each AI solution. AI 
components should be explicitly considered in their audit planning process, 
independent of the larger systems in which they sit. They should understand 
and handle compliance breaches and determine the frequency of the review 
required for each AI solution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While adoption rates have been slow, AI will increasingly become an inte-
gral component of FS firms’ strategies to achieve operational efficiency, im-
prove customer service, and gain insights for competitive advantage. It is im-
perative that organizations understand the implications of this adoption from 
a risk perspective, such that appropriate governance and controls are put in 
place to mitigate the new and exacerbated risks.  
This paper explored the practical implications of risk management 
throughout an AI solution’s product lifecycle. With a particular focus on the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, suggested approaches were cou-
pled with regulatory principles and precedents. The primary highlighted exam-
ple use case was the risk of discrimination against protected classes. While 
there has been a wide array of studies on the technical and theoretical defini-
tions of fairness, further work is required to devise a framework to determine 
which definitions are most appropriate in the practical implementation of fair-
ness metrics in FS industry. 
Risks of AI are not confined to the algorithm itself, but rather affect the 
entire organization. AI-specific considerations should be integrated into exist-
ing RMFs to ensure they remain fit for purpose. Only then will FS firms feel 
 46. Id. 
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empowered to use AI, having the confidence that AI-related risks can be ef-
fectively identified and managed. 
 
